mirror of https://github.com/docker/cli.git
2.9 KiB
2.9 KiB
v4.0.1
Fixed
- An attacker could send a JWE containing compressed data that used large
amounts of memory and CPU when decompressed by
DecryptorDecryptMulti. Those functions now return an error if the decompressed data would exceed 250kB or 10x the compressed size (whichever is larger). Thanks to Enze Wang@Alioth and Jianjun Chen@Zhongguancun Lab (@zer0yu and @chenjj) for reporting.
v4.0.0
This release makes some breaking changes in order to more thoroughly address the vulnerabilities discussed in Three New Attacks Against JSON Web Tokens, "Sign/encrypt confusion", "Billion hash attack", and "Polyglot token".
Changed
- Limit JWT encryption types (exclude password or public key types) (#78)
- Enforce minimum length for HMAC keys (#85)
- jwt: match any audience in a list, rather than requiring all audiences (#81)
- jwt: accept only Compact Serialization (#75)
- jws: Add expected algorithms for signatures (#74)
- Require specifying expected algorithms for ParseEncrypted,
ParseSigned, ParseDetached, jwt.ParseEncrypted, jwt.ParseSigned,
jwt.ParseSignedAndEncrypted (#69, #74)
- Usually there is a small, known set of appropriate algorithms for a program to use and it's a mistake to allow unexpected algorithms. For instance the "billion hash attack" relies in part on programs accepting the PBES2 encryption algorithm and doing the necessary work even if they weren't specifically configured to allow PBES2.
- Revert "Strip padding off base64 strings" (#82)
- The specs require base64url encoding without padding.
- Minimum supported Go version is now 1.21
Added
- ParseSignedCompact, ParseSignedJSON, ParseEncryptedCompact, ParseEncryptedJSON.
- These allow parsing a specific serialization, as opposed to ParseSigned and ParseEncrypted, which try to automatically detect which serialization was provided. It's common to require a specific serialization for a specific protocol - for instance JWT requires Compact serialization.
v3.0.3
Fixed
- Limit decompression output size to prevent a DoS. Backport from v4.0.1.
v3.0.2
Fixed
- DecryptMulti: handle decompression error (#19)
Changed
- jwe/CompactSerialize: improve performance (#67)
- Increase the default number of PBKDF2 iterations to 600k (#48)
- Return the proper algorithm for ECDSA keys (#45)
Added
- Add Thumbprint support for opaque signers (#38)
v3.0.1
Fixed
- Security issue: an attacker specifying a large "p2c" value can cause JSONWebEncryption.Decrypt and JSONWebEncryption.DecryptMulti to consume large amounts of CPU, causing a DoS. Thanks to Matt Schwager (@mschwager) for the disclosure and to Tom Tervoort for originally publishing the category of attack. https://i.blackhat.com/BH-US-23/Presentations/US-23-Tervoort-Three-New-Attacks-Against-JSON-Web-Tokens.pdf