Before this patch:
```
Usage: docker build [OPTIONS] PATH | URL | -
Build an image from a Dockerfile
Options:
--add-host list Add a custom host-to-IP mapping (host:ip)
--build-arg list Set build-time variables
--cache-from strings Images to consider as cache sources
--cgroup-parent string Optional parent cgroup for the container
--cpu-period int Limit the CPU CFS (Completely Fair Scheduler) period
--cpu-quota int Limit the CPU CFS (Completely Fair Scheduler) quota
-c, --cpu-shares int CPU shares (relative weight)
--cpuset-cpus string CPUs in which to allow execution (0-3, 0,1)
--cpuset-mems string MEMs in which to allow execution (0-3, 0,1)
--disable-content-trust Skip image verification (default true)
-f, --file string Name of the Dockerfile (Default is 'PATH/Dockerfile')
--force-rm Always remove intermediate containers
--iidfile string Write the image ID to the file
--isolation string Container isolation technology
--label list Set metadata for an image
-m, --memory bytes Memory limit
--memory-swap bytes Swap limit equal to memory plus swap: '-1' to enable unlimited swap
--network string Set the networking mode for the RUN instructions during build (default "default")
--no-cache Do not use cache when building the image
-o, --output stringArray Output destination (format: type=local,dest=path)
--platform string Set platform if server is multi-platform capable
--progress string Set type of progress output (auto, plain, tty). Use plain to show container output (default "auto")
--pull Always attempt to pull a newer version of the image
-q, --quiet Suppress the build output and print image ID on success
--rm Remove intermediate containers after a successful build (default true)
--secret stringArray Secret file to expose to the build (only if BuildKit enabled): id=mysecret,src=/local/secret
--security-opt strings Security options
--shm-size bytes Size of /dev/shm
--squash Squash newly built layers into a single new layer
--ssh stringArray SSH agent socket or keys to expose to the build (only if BuildKit enabled) (format: default|<id>[=<socket>|<key>[,<key>]])
-t, --tag list Name and optionally a tag in the 'name:tag' format
--target string Set the target build stage to build.
--ulimit ulimit Ulimit options (default [])
```
With this patch applied:
```
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --help
Usage: docker build [OPTIONS] PATH | URL | -
Build an image from a Dockerfile
Options:
--add-host list Add a custom host-to-IP mapping (host:ip)
--build-arg list Set build-time variables
--cache-from strings Images to consider as cache sources
--disable-content-trust Skip image verification (default true)
-f, --file string Name of the Dockerfile (Default is 'PATH/Dockerfile')
--iidfile string Write the image ID to the file
--isolation string Container isolation technology
--label list Set metadata for an image
--network string Set the networking mode for the RUN instructions during build (default "default")
--no-cache Do not use cache when building the image
-o, --output stringArray Output destination (format: type=local,dest=path)
--platform string Set platform if server is multi-platform capable
--progress string Set type of progress output (auto, plain, tty). Use plain to show container output (default "auto")
--pull Always attempt to pull a newer version of the image
-q, --quiet Suppress the build output and print image ID on success
--secret stringArray Secret file to expose to the build (only if BuildKit enabled): id=mysecret,src=/local/secret
--squash Squash newly built layers into a single new layer
--ssh stringArray SSH agent socket or keys to expose to the build (only if BuildKit enabled) (format: default|<id>[=<socket>|<key>[,<key>]])
-t, --tag list Name and optionally a tag in the 'name:tag' format
--target string Set the target build stage to build.
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
--stream was always experimental and this patch removes the functionality.
Users should enable BuildKit with DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1
Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.12.9...go1.12.10
```
Hi gophers,
We have just released Go 1.13.1 and Go 1.12.10 to address a recently reported security issue. We recommend that all affected users update to one of these releases (if you're not sure which, choose Go 1.13.1).
net/http (through net/textproto) used to accept and normalize invalid HTTP/1.1 headers with a space before the colon, in violation of RFC 7230. If a Go server is used behind an uncommon reverse proxy that accepts and forwards but doesn't normalize such invalid headers, the reverse proxy and the server can interpret the headers differently. This can lead to filter bypasses or request smuggling, the latter if requests from separate clients are multiplexed onto the same upstream connection by the proxy. Such invalid headers are now rejected by Go servers, and passed without normalization to Go client applications.
The issue is CVE-2019-16276 and Go issue golang.org/issue/34540.
Thanks to Andrew Stucki, Adam Scarr (99designs.com), and Jan Masarik (masarik.sh) for discovering and reporting this issue.
Downloads are available at https://golang.org/dl for all supported platforms.
Alla prossima,
Filippo on behalf of the Go team
```
From the patch: 6e6f4aaf70
```
net/textproto: don't normalize headers with spaces before the colon
RFC 7230 is clear about headers with a space before the colon, like
X-Answer : 42
being invalid, but we've been accepting and normalizing them for compatibility
purposes since CL 5690059 in 2012.
On the client side, this is harmless and indeed most browsers behave the same
to this day. On the server side, this becomes a security issue when the
behavior doesn't match that of a reverse proxy sitting in front of the server.
For example, if a WAF accepts them without normalizing them, it might be
possible to bypass its filters, because the Go server would interpret the
header differently. Worse, if the reverse proxy coalesces requests onto a
single HTTP/1.1 connection to a Go server, the understanding of the request
boundaries can get out of sync between them, allowing an attacker to tack an
arbitrary method and path onto a request by other clients, including
authentication headers unknown to the attacker.
This was recently presented at multiple security conferences:
https://portswigger.net/blog/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn
net/http servers already reject header keys with invalid characters.
Simply stop normalizing extra spaces in net/textproto, let it return them
unchanged like it does for other invalid headers, and let net/http enforce
RFC 7230, which is HTTP specific. This loses us normalization on the client
side, but there's no right answer on the client side anyway, and hiding the
issue sounds worse than letting the application decide.
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This is currently just a copy of the v3.8 schema, in preparation
of new features to be added in the new schema.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Lukas Heeren
Tibor Vass
Kirill Kolyshkin
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Adrian Plata
Silvin Lubecki
Harald Albers
Tibor Vass
Michael Crosby
Christopher Crone
Trapier Marshall
Ulysses Souza
Tõnis Tiigi
Carlos de Paula
Vincent Demeester
Paweł Szczekutowicz
Daniel Artine
knqyf263
Tim Sampson