This test was intending to run all tests, but didn't, which was
caught by golangci-lint;
cli/compose/loader/windows_path_test.go:46:17: SA4010: this result of append is never used, except maybe in other appends (staticcheck)
tests := append(isabstests, winisabstests...)
^
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 0a21de05d2)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Looks like we're just on the edge of the deadline, and it's sometimes
failing;
```
cli/command/image/trust.go:346:1⚠️ nolint directive did not match any issue (nolint)
cli/command/manifest/push.go:211:1⚠️ nolint directive did not match any issue (nolint)
internal/pkg/containerized/snapshot.go:95:1⚠️ nolint directive did not match any issue (nolint)
internal/pkg/containerized/snapshot.go:138:1⚠️ nolint directive did not match any issue (nolint)
WARNING: deadline exceeded by linter interfacer (try increasing --deadline)
Exited with code 3
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 3e78cbc021)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The configuration abused "Exclude" to exclude file-paths by filtering
on the output, however, the `Skip` option was designed for that, whereas
`Exclude` is for matching warnings.
An explicit "Skip" was added for "vendor", because even though the vendor
directory should already be ignored by the linter, in some situations,
it still seemed to warn on issues, so let's explicitly ignore it.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 71e525f74f)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
--stars example is deprecated. Changing to --filter=stars=5
Signed-off-by: danielartine <daniel.artine@ufrj.br>
(cherry picked from commit bba0a4d5ac)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
exec.CombinedOutput should not be used here because:
- it redirects cmd Stdout and Stderr and we want it to be the tty
- it calls cmd.Run which we already did
While at it
- use pty.Start() as it is cleaner
- make sure we don't leave a zombie running, by calling Wait() in defer
- use test.Name() for containerName
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit bc4ed69a23)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Add a test to verify that killing the docker CLI forwards
the signal to the container. Test-case for moby/moby 28872
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 7cf1a8d4c9)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This partially reverts e0b59ab52b,
and does not automatically disable proxying signals in TTY-mode
Before this change:
------------------------------------
Start a container with a TTY in one shell:
```
docker run -it --init --name repro-28872 busybox sleep 30
```
then, in another shell, kill the docker cli:
```
kill `pgrep -f repro-28872`
```
Notice that the CLI was killed, but the signal not forwarded to the container;
the container continues running
```
docker container inspect --format '{{ .State.Status }}' repro-28872
running
docker container rm -f repro-28872
```
After this change:
------------------------------------
Start a container with a TTY in one shell:
```
docker run -it --init --name repro-28872 busybox sleep 30
```
then, in another shell, kill the docker cli:
```
kill `pgrep -f repro-28872`
```
Verify that the signal was forwarded to the container, and the container exited
```
docker container inspect --format '{{ .State.Status }}' repro-28872
exited
docker container rm -f repro-28872
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit ee29504923)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Golang 1.12.12
-------------------------------
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.12.11...go1.12.12
go1.12.12 (released 2019/10/17) includes fixes to the go command, runtime,
syscall and net packages. See the Go 1.12.12 milestone on our issue tracker for
details.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.12.12
Golang 1.12.11 (CVE-2019-17596)
-------------------------------
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.12.10...go1.12.11
go1.12.11 (released 2019/10/17) includes security fixes to the crypto/dsa
package. See the Go 1.12.11 milestone on our issue tracker for details.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.12.11
[security] Go 1.13.2 and Go 1.12.11 are released
Hi gophers,
We have just released Go 1.13.2 and Go 1.12.11 to address a recently reported
security issue. We recommend that all affected users update to one of these
releases (if you're not sure which, choose Go 1.13.2).
Invalid DSA public keys can cause a panic in dsa.Verify. In particular, using
crypto/x509.Verify on a crafted X.509 certificate chain can lead to a panic,
even if the certificates don't chain to a trusted root. The chain can be
delivered via a crypto/tls connection to a client, or to a server that accepts
and verifies client certificates. net/http clients can be made to crash by an
HTTPS server, while net/http servers that accept client certificates will
recover the panic and are unaffected.
Moreover, an application might crash invoking
crypto/x509.(*CertificateRequest).CheckSignature on an X.509 certificate
request, parsing a golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp Entity, or during a
golang.org/x/crypto/otr conversation. Finally, a golang.org/x/crypto/ssh client
can panic due to a malformed host key, while a server could panic if either
PublicKeyCallback accepts a malformed public key, or if IsUserAuthority accepts
a certificate with a malformed public key.
The issue is CVE-2019-17596 and Go issue golang.org/issue/34960.
Thanks to Daniel Mandragona for discovering and reporting this issue. We'd also
like to thank regilero for a previous disclosure of CVE-2019-16276.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 474d522ee2)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This avoids having a redundant `env_file` entry
output when rendering the compose file
Signed-off-by: Ulysses Souza <ulysses.souza@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 821f5ecf53)
Signed-off-by: Christopher Crone <christopher.crone@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Christopher Crone <christopher.crone@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 91cf8b04c9)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.12.9...go1.12.10
```
Hi gophers,
We have just released Go 1.13.1 and Go 1.12.10 to address a recently reported security issue. We recommend that all affected users update to one of these releases (if you're not sure which, choose Go 1.13.1).
net/http (through net/textproto) used to accept and normalize invalid HTTP/1.1 headers with a space before the colon, in violation of RFC 7230. If a Go server is used behind an uncommon reverse proxy that accepts and forwards but doesn't normalize such invalid headers, the reverse proxy and the server can interpret the headers differently. This can lead to filter bypasses or request smuggling, the latter if requests from separate clients are multiplexed onto the same upstream connection by the proxy. Such invalid headers are now rejected by Go servers, and passed without normalization to Go client applications.
The issue is CVE-2019-16276 and Go issue golang.org/issue/34540.
Thanks to Andrew Stucki, Adam Scarr (99designs.com), and Jan Masarik (masarik.sh) for discovering and reporting this issue.
Downloads are available at https://golang.org/dl for all supported platforms.
Alla prossima,
Filippo on behalf of the Go team
```
From the patch: 6e6f4aaf70
```
net/textproto: don't normalize headers with spaces before the colon
RFC 7230 is clear about headers with a space before the colon, like
X-Answer : 42
being invalid, but we've been accepting and normalizing them for compatibility
purposes since CL 5690059 in 2012.
On the client side, this is harmless and indeed most browsers behave the same
to this day. On the server side, this becomes a security issue when the
behavior doesn't match that of a reverse proxy sitting in front of the server.
For example, if a WAF accepts them without normalizing them, it might be
possible to bypass its filters, because the Go server would interpret the
header differently. Worse, if the reverse proxy coalesces requests onto a
single HTTP/1.1 connection to a Go server, the understanding of the request
boundaries can get out of sync between them, allowing an attacker to tack an
arbitrary method and path onto a request by other clients, including
authentication headers unknown to the attacker.
This was recently presented at multiple security conferences:
https://portswigger.net/blog/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn
net/http servers already reject header keys with invalid characters.
Simply stop normalizing extra spaces in net/textproto, let it return them
unchanged like it does for other invalid headers, and let net/http enforce
RFC 7230, which is HTTP specific. This loses us normalization on the client
side, but there's no right answer on the client side anyway, and hiding the
issue sounds worse than letting the application decide.
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 8743e36a45)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
full diff: 6120d95c0e...v1.0.2
relevant changes:
- miekg/pkcs11#110 Fix issue freeing memory on GetOperationState when NOT CK_OK
- miekg/pkcs11#106 Move to go modules
- miekg/pkcs11#104 Expose login API for vendor specific login types
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 54428b1f37)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Silvin Lubecki
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Silvin Lubecki
Andrew Hsu
Daniel Helfand
Brandon Mitchell
Adrian Plata
Daniel Artine
Odin Ugedal
Daniel Cassidy
Forest Johnson
Kir Kolyshkin
Harald Albers
Trapier Marshall
Morten Hekkvang
Morten Hekkvang
Tim Sampson
Ulysses Souza
Christopher Crone
Sebastiaan van Stijn