// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR LGPL-2.1-or-later /* * Copyright (C) 2019 Aleksa Sarai * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LLC * * This work is dual licensed under the following licenses. You may use, * redistribute, and/or modify the work under the conditions of either (or * both) licenses. * * === Apache-2.0 === * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * * === LGPL-2.1-or-later === * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. * * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU * Lesser General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public * License along with this library. If not, see * . * */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */ #if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create) # define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create #endif /* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from . */ #ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC # define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U # define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U #endif int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags) { #ifdef SYS_memfd_create return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags); #else errno = ENOSYS; return -1; #endif } /* This comes directly from . */ #ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE # define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024 #endif #ifndef F_ADD_SEALS # define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9) # define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10) #endif #ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL # define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set */ # define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */ # define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */ # define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */ #endif #define CLONED_BINARY_ENV "_LIBCONTAINER_CLONED_BINARY" #define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe" #define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \ (F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE) static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size) { void *old = ptr; do { ptr = realloc(old, size); } while(!ptr); return ptr; } /* * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed. */ static int is_self_cloned(void) { int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0; struct stat statbuf = {}; struct statfs fsbuf = {}; fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "you have no read access to runc binary file\n"); return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; } /* * Is the binary a fully-sealed memfd? We don't need CLONED_BINARY_ENV for * this, because you cannot write to a sealed memfd no matter what (so * sharing it isn't a bad thing -- and an admin could bind-mount a sealed * memfd to /usr/bin/runc to allow re-use). */ ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS); if (ret >= 0) { is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS); goto out; } /* * All other forms require CLONED_BINARY_ENV, since they are potentially * writeable (or we can't tell if they're fully safe) and thus we must * check the environment as an extra layer of defence. */ if (!getenv(CLONED_BINARY_ENV)) { is_cloned = false; goto out; } /* * Is the binary on a read-only filesystem? We can't detect bind-mounts in * particular (in-kernel they are identical to regular mounts) but we can * at least be sure that it's read-only. In addition, to make sure that * it's *our* bind-mount we check CLONED_BINARY_ENV. */ if (fstatfs(fd, &fsbuf) >= 0) is_cloned |= (fsbuf.f_flags & MS_RDONLY); /* * Okay, we're a tmpfile -- or we're currently running on RHEL <=7.6 * which appears to have a borked backport of F_GET_SEALS. Either way, * having a file which has no hardlinks indicates that we aren't using * a host-side "runc" binary and this is something that a container * cannot fake (because unlinking requires being able to resolve the * path that you want to unlink). */ if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) >= 0) is_cloned |= (statbuf.st_nlink == 0); out: close(fd); return is_cloned; } /* Read a given file into a new buffer, and providing the length. */ static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length) { int fd; char buf[4096], *copy = NULL; if (!length) return NULL; fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) return NULL; *length = 0; for (;;) { ssize_t n; n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (n < 0) goto error; if (!n) break; copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy)); memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n); *length += n; } close(fd); return copy; error: close(fd); free(copy); return NULL; } /* * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry * to the array of pointers. */ static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output) { int num = 0; char *cur = data; if (!data || *output != NULL) return -1; while (cur < data + data_length) { num++; *output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output)); (*output)[num - 1] = cur; cur += strlen(cur) + 1; } (*output)[num] = NULL; return num; } /* * "Parse" out argv from /proc/self/cmdline. * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a * main() that we can just get the arguments from. */ static int fetchve(char ***argv) { char *cmdline = NULL; size_t cmdline_size; cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size); if (!cmdline) goto error; if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0) goto error; return 0; error: free(cmdline); return -EINVAL; } enum { EFD_NONE = 0, EFD_MEMFD, EFD_FILE, }; /* * This comes from . We can't hard-code __O_TMPFILE because it * changes depending on the architecture. If we don't have O_TMPFILE we always * have the mkostemp(3) fallback. */ #ifndef O_TMPFILE # if defined(__O_TMPFILE) && defined(O_DIRECTORY) # define O_TMPFILE (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY) # endif #endif static int make_execfd(int *fdtype) { int fd = -1; char template[PATH_MAX] = {0}; char *prefix = getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR"); if (!prefix || *prefix != '/') prefix = "/tmp"; if (snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/runc.XXXXXX", prefix) < 0) return -1; /* * Now try memfd, it's much nicer than actually creating a file in STATEDIR * since it's easily detected thanks to sealing and also doesn't require * assumptions about STATEDIR. */ *fdtype = EFD_MEMFD; fd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING); if (fd >= 0) return fd; if (errno != ENOSYS && errno != EINVAL) goto error; #ifdef O_TMPFILE /* * Try O_TMPFILE to avoid races where someone might snatch our file. Note * that O_EXCL isn't actually a security measure here (since you can just * fd re-open it and clear O_EXCL). */ *fdtype = EFD_FILE; fd = open(prefix, O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0700); if (fd >= 0) { struct stat statbuf = {}; bool working_otmpfile = false; /* * open(2) ignores unknown O_* flags -- yeah, I was surprised when I * found this out too. As a result we can't check for EINVAL. However, * if we get nlink != 0 (or EISDIR) then we know that this kernel * doesn't support O_TMPFILE. */ if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) >= 0) working_otmpfile = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0); if (working_otmpfile) return fd; /* Pretend that we got EISDIR since O_TMPFILE failed. */ close(fd); errno = EISDIR; } if (errno != EISDIR) goto error; #endif /* defined(O_TMPFILE) */ /* * Our final option is to create a temporary file the old-school way, and * then unlink it so that nothing else sees it by accident. */ *fdtype = EFD_FILE; fd = mkostemp(template, O_CLOEXEC); if (fd >= 0) { if (unlink(template) >= 0) return fd; close(fd); } error: *fdtype = EFD_NONE; return -1; } static int seal_execfd(int *fd, int fdtype) { switch (fdtype) { case EFD_MEMFD: return fcntl(*fd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS); case EFD_FILE: { /* Need to re-open our pseudo-memfd as an O_PATH to avoid execve(2) giving -ETXTBSY. */ int newfd; char fdpath[PATH_MAX] = {0}; if (fchmod(*fd, 0100) < 0) return -1; if (snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/self/fd/%d", *fd) < 0) return -1; newfd = open(fdpath, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); if (newfd < 0) return -1; close(*fd); *fd = newfd; return 0; } default: break; } return -1; } static int try_bindfd(void) { int fd, ret = -1; char template[PATH_MAX] = {0}; char *prefix = getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_STATEDIR"); if (!prefix || *prefix != '/') prefix = "/tmp"; if (snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/runc.XXXXXX", prefix) < 0) return ret; /* * We need somewhere to mount it, mounting anything over /proc/self is a * BAD idea on the host -- even if we do it temporarily. */ fd = mkstemp(template); if (fd < 0) return ret; close(fd); /* * For obvious reasons this won't work in rootless mode because we haven't * created a userns+mntns -- but getting that to work will be a bit * complicated and it's only worth doing if someone actually needs it. */ ret = -EPERM; if (mount("/proc/self/exe", template, "", MS_BIND, "") < 0) goto out; if (mount("", template, "", MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND | MS_RDONLY, "") < 0) goto out_umount; /* Get read-only handle that we're sure can't be made read-write. */ ret = open(template, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); out_umount: /* * Make sure the MNT_DETACH works, otherwise we could get remounted * read-write and that would be quite bad (the fd would be made read-write * too, invalidating the protection). */ if (umount2(template, MNT_DETACH) < 0) { if (ret >= 0) close(ret); ret = -ENOTRECOVERABLE; } out: /* * We don't care about unlink errors, the worst that happens is that * there's an empty file left around in STATEDIR. */ unlink(template); return ret; } static ssize_t fd_to_fd(int outfd, int infd) { ssize_t total = 0; char buffer[4096]; for (;;) { ssize_t nread, nwritten = 0; nread = read(infd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); if (nread < 0) return -1; if (!nread) break; do { ssize_t n = write(outfd, buffer + nwritten, nread - nwritten); if (n < 0) return -1; nwritten += n; } while(nwritten < nread); total += nwritten; } return total; } static int clone_binary(void) { int binfd, execfd; struct stat statbuf = {}; size_t sent = 0; int fdtype = EFD_NONE; /* * Before we resort to copying, let's try creating an ro-binfd in one shot * by getting a handle for a read-only bind-mount of the execfd. */ execfd = try_bindfd(); if (execfd >= 0) return execfd; /* * Dammit, that didn't work -- time to copy the binary to a safe place we * can seal the contents. */ execfd = make_execfd(&fdtype); if (execfd < 0 || fdtype == EFD_NONE) return -ENOTRECOVERABLE; binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); if (binfd < 0) goto error; if (fstat(binfd, &statbuf) < 0) goto error_binfd; while (sent < statbuf.st_size) { int n = sendfile(execfd, binfd, NULL, statbuf.st_size - sent); if (n < 0) { /* sendfile can fail so we fallback to a dumb user-space copy. */ n = fd_to_fd(execfd, binfd); if (n < 0) goto error_binfd; } sent += n; } close(binfd); if (sent != statbuf.st_size) goto error; if (seal_execfd(&execfd, fdtype) < 0) goto error; return execfd; error_binfd: close(binfd); error: close(execfd); return -EIO; } /* Get cheap access to the environment. */ extern char **environ; int ensure_cloned_binary(void) { int execfd; char **argv = NULL; /* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */ int cloned = is_self_cloned(); if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE) return cloned; if (fetchve(&argv) < 0) return -EINVAL; execfd = clone_binary(); if (execfd < 0) return -EIO; if (putenv(CLONED_BINARY_ENV "=1")) goto error; fexecve(execfd, argv, environ); error: close(execfd); return -ENOEXEC; }