Includes a security fix for crypto/elliptic (CVE-2023-24532).
> go1.19.7 (released 2023-03-07) includes a security fix to the crypto/elliptic
> package, as well as bug fixes to the linker, the runtime, and the crypto/x509
> and syscall packages. See the Go 1.19.7 milestone on our issue tracker for
> details.
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.19.minor
From the announcement:
> We have just released Go versions 1.20.2 and 1.19.7, minor point releases.
>
> These minor releases include 1 security fixes following the security policy:
>
> - crypto/elliptic: incorrect P-256 ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult results
>
> The ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult methods of the P256 Curve may return an
> incorrect result if called with some specific unreduced scalars (a scalar larger
> than the order of the curve).
>
> This does not impact usages of crypto/ecdsa or crypto/ecdh.
>
> This is CVE-2023-24532 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/58647.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 23da1cec6c)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Make the error more specific by stating that it's caused by a specific
environment variable and not an environment as a whole.
Also don't escape the variable to make it more readable.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 012b77952e)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
On Windows, ignore all variables that start with "=" when building an
environment variables map for stack.
For MS-DOS compatibility cmd.exe can set some special environment
variables that start with a "=" characters, which breaks the general
assumption that the first encountered "=" separates a variable name from
variable value and causes trouble when parsing.
These variables don't seem to be documented anywhere, but they are
described by some third-party sources and confirmed empirically on my
Windows installation.
Useful sources:
https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20100506-00/?p=14133https://ss64.com/nt/syntax-variables.html
Known variables:
- `=ExitCode` stores the exit code returned by external command (in hex
format)
- `=ExitCodeAscii` - same as above, except the value is the ASCII
representation of the code (so exit code 65 (0x41) becomes 'A').
- `=::=::\` and friends - store drive specific working directory.
There is one env variable for each separate drive letter that was
accessed in the shell session and stores the working directory for that
specific drive.
The general format for these is:
`=<DRIVE_LETTER>:=<CWD>` (key=`=<DRIVE_LETTER>:`, value=`<CWD>`)
where <CWD> is a working directory for the drive that is assigned to
the letter <DRIVE_LETTER>
A couple of examples:
`=C:=C:\some\dir` (key: `=C:`, value: `C:\some\dir`)
`=D:=D:\some\other\dir` (key: `=C:`, value: `C:\some\dir`)
`=Z:=Z:\` (key: `=Z:`, value: `Z:\`)
`=::=::\` is the one that seems to be always set and I'm not exactly
sure what this one is for (what's drive `::`?). Others are set as
soon as you CD to a path on some drive. Considering that you start a
cmd.exe also has some working directory, there are 2 of these on start.
All these variables can be safely ignored because they can't be
deliberately set by the user, their meaning is only relevant to the
cmd.exe session and they're all are related to the MS-DOS/Batch feature
that are irrelevant for us.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit a47058bbd5)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8bc1aaceae)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Tests mocking the output of GET images/json with fakeClient used an
array with one empty element as an empty response.
Change it to just an empty array.
Signed-off-by: Paweł Gronowski <pawel.gronowski@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit a1953e19b2)
go1.19.6 (released 2023-02-14) includes security fixes to the crypto/tls,
mime/multipart, net/http, and path/filepath packages, as well as bug fixes to
the go command, the linker, the runtime, and the crypto/x509, net/http, and
time packages. See the Go 1.19.6 milestone on our issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.19.6+label%3ACherryPickApproved
From the announcement on the security mailing:
We have just released Go versions 1.20.1 and 1.19.6, minor point releases.
These minor releases include 4 security fixes following the security policy:
- path/filepath: path traversal in filepath.Clean on Windows
On Windows, the filepath.Clean function could transform an invalid path such
as a/../c:/b into the valid path c:\b. This transformation of a relative (if
invalid) path into an absolute path could enable a directory traversal attack.
The filepath.Clean function will now transform this path into the relative
(but still invalid) path .\c:\b.
This is CVE-2022-41722 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/57274.
- net/http, mime/multipart: denial of service from excessive resource
consumption
Multipart form parsing with mime/multipart.Reader.ReadForm can consume largely
unlimited amounts of memory and disk files. This also affects form parsing in
the net/http package with the Request methods FormFile, FormValue,
ParseMultipartForm, and PostFormValue.
ReadForm takes a maxMemory parameter, and is documented as storing "up to
maxMemory bytes +10MB (reserved for non-file parts) in memory". File parts
which cannot be stored in memory are stored on disk in temporary files. The
unconfigurable 10MB reserved for non-file parts is excessively large and can
potentially open a denial of service vector on its own. However, ReadForm did
not properly account for all memory consumed by a parsed form, such as map
ntry overhead, part names, and MIME headers, permitting a maliciously crafted
form to consume well over 10MB. In addition, ReadForm contained no limit on
the number of disk files created, permitting a relatively small request body
to create a large number of disk temporary files.
ReadForm now properly accounts for various forms of memory overhead, and
should now stay within its documented limit of 10MB + maxMemory bytes of
memory consumption. Users should still be aware that this limit is high and
may still be hazardous.
ReadForm now creates at most one on-disk temporary file, combining multiple
form parts into a single temporary file. The mime/multipart.File interface
type's documentation states, "If stored on disk, the File's underlying
concrete type will be an *os.File.". This is no longer the case when a form
contains more than one file part, due to this coalescing of parts into a
single file. The previous behavior of using distinct files for each form part
may be reenabled with the environment variable
GODEBUG=multipartfiles=distinct.
Users should be aware that multipart.ReadForm and the http.Request methods
that call it do not limit the amount of disk consumed by temporary files.
Callers can limit the size of form data with http.MaxBytesReader.
This is CVE-2022-41725 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/58006.
- crypto/tls: large handshake records may cause panics
Both clients and servers may send large TLS handshake records which cause
servers and clients, respectively, to panic when attempting to construct
responses.
This affects all TLS 1.3 clients, TLS 1.2 clients which explicitly enable
session resumption (by setting Config.ClientSessionCache to a non-nil value),
and TLS 1.3 servers which request client certificates (by setting
Config.ClientAuth
> = RequestClientCert).
This is CVE-2022-41724 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/58001.
- net/http: avoid quadratic complexity in HPACK decoding
A maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption
in the HPACK decoder, sufficient to cause a denial of service from a small
number of small requests.
This issue is also fixed in golang.org/x/net/http2 v0.7.0, for users manually
configuring HTTP/2.
This is CVE-2022-41723 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/57855.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit e921e103a4)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The error returned from "os/exec".Command when attempting to execute a
directory has been changed from syscall.EACCESS to syscall.EISDIR on
Go 1.20. 2b8f214094
Consequently, any runc runtime built against Go 1.20 will return an
error containing 'is a directory' and not 'permission denied'. Update
the string matching so the CLI exits with status code 126 on 'is a
directory' errors (EISDIR) in addition to 'permission denied' (EACCESS).
Signed-off-by: Cory Snider <csnider@mirantis.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9b5ceb52b0)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This prevents us needing to attempt to reconstruct the exact indentation
registry side, which is not canonical - so may differ.
Signed-off-by: Justin Chadwell <me@jedevc.com>
This behavior should not break any more use cases than before.
Previously, if the mismatch occured, we would actually push a manifest
that we then never referred to in the manifest list! If this was done in
a new repository, the command would fail with an obscure error from the
registry - the content wouldn't exist with the descriptor we expect it
to.
Signed-off-by: Justin Chadwell <me@jedevc.com>
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Paweł Gronowski
Jacopo Rigoli
Nick Santos
Bjorn Neergaard
Aslam Ahemad
CrazyMax
Brian Goff
Cory Snider
Albin Kerouanton
Laura Brehm
David Karlsson
Akihiro Suda
Justin Chadwell
craig-osterhout