This is currently just a copy of the v3.8 schema, in preparation
of new features to be added in the new schema.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
full diff: 6120d95c0e...v1.0.2
relevant changes:
- miekg/pkcs11#110 Fix issue freeing memory on GetOperationState when NOT CK_OK
- miekg/pkcs11#106 Move to go modules
- miekg/pkcs11#104 Expose login API for vendor specific login types
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
For now, just verifying that an error is returned, but not checking the
error message itself, because those are not under our control, and may
change with different Go versions.
```
=== Failed
=== FAIL: opts TestParseDockerDaemonHost (0.00s)
hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
=== FAIL: opts TestParseTCP (0.00s)
hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
go1.12.8 (released 2019/08/13) includes security fixes to the net/http and net/url packages.
See the Go 1.12.8 milestone on our issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.12.8
- net/http: Denial of Service vulnerabilities in the HTTP/2 implementation
net/http and golang.org/x/net/http2 servers that accept direct connections from untrusted
clients could be remotely made to allocate an unlimited amount of memory, until the program
crashes. Servers will now close connections if the send queue accumulates too many control
messages.
The issues are CVE-2019-9512 and CVE-2019-9514, and Go issue golang.org/issue/33606.
Thanks to Jonathan Looney from Netflix for discovering and reporting these issues.
This is also fixed in version v0.0.0-20190813141303-74dc4d7220e7 of golang.org/x/net/http2.
net/url: parsing validation issue
- url.Parse would accept URLs with malformed hosts, such that the Host field could have arbitrary
suffixes that would appear in neither Hostname() nor Port(), allowing authorization bypasses
in certain applications. Note that URLs with invalid, not numeric ports will now return an error
from url.Parse.
The issue is CVE-2019-14809 and Go issue golang.org/issue/29098.
Thanks to Julian Hector and Nikolai Krein from Cure53, and Adi Cohen (adico.me) for discovering
and reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Sam
Tibor Vass
Tibor Vass
Adrian Plata
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Ulysses Souza
Michael Irwin
Tõnis Tiigi
Carlos de Paula
Morten Hekkvang
Silvin Lubecki
Kirill Kolyshkin
Vincent Demeester
Paweł Szczekutowicz
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Daniel Artine
knqyf263
Tim Sampson
Nicolas De Loof
Jose J. Escobar
Odin Ugedal
Jintao Zhang