> Legacy PEM encryption as specified in RFC 1423 is insecure by design. Since
> it does not authenticate the ciphertext, it is vulnerable to padding oracle
> attacks that can let an attacker recover the plaintext
From https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/264159
> It's unfortunate that we don't implement PKCS#8 encryption so we can't
> recommend an alternative but PEM encryption is so broken that it's worth
> deprecating outright.
This feature allowed using an encrypted private key with a supplied password,
but did not provide additional security as the encryption is known to be broken,
and the key is sitting next to the password in the filesystem. Users are recommended
to decrypt the private key, and store it un-encrypted to continue using it.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
> Legacy PEM encryption as specified in RFC 1423 is insecure by design. Since
> it does not authenticate the ciphertext, it is vulnerable to padding oracle
> attacks that can let an attacker recover the plaintext
From https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/264159
> It's unfortunate that we don't implement PKCS#8 encryption so we can't
> recommend an alternative but PEM encryption is so broken that it's worth
> deprecating outright.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
From https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/264159
> It's unfortunate that we don't implement PKCS#8 encryption so we can't
> recommend an alternative but PEM encryption is so broken that it's worth
> deprecating outright.
When linting on Go 1.16:
cli/context/docker/load.go:69:6: SA1019: x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock is deprecated: Legacy PEM encryption as specified in RFC 1423 is insecure by design. Since it does not authenticate the ciphertext, it is vulnerable to padding oracle attacks that can let an attacker recover the plaintext. (staticcheck)
if x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(pemBlock) {
^
cli/context/docker/load.go:70:20: SA1019: x509.DecryptPEMBlock is deprecated: Legacy PEM encryption as specified in RFC 1423 is insecure by design. Since it does not authenticate the ciphertext, it is vulnerable to padding oracle attacks that can let an attacker recover the plaintext. (staticcheck)
keyBytes, err = x509.DecryptPEMBlock(pemBlock, []byte(c.TLSPassword))
^
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This reverts commit 59defcb34d which caused #1892
since the timeout applied not only to the dial phase but to everything, so it
would kill `docker logs -f ...` if the container was not chatty enough.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ijc@docker.com>
This partially mitigates #1739 ("Docker commands take 1 minute to timeout if
context endpoint is unreachable") and is a simpler alternative to #1747 (which
completely defers the client connection until an actual call is attempted).
Note that the previous 60s delay was the culmination of two separate 30s
timeouts since the ping is tried twice. This with this patch the overall
timeout is 20s. https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/39206 will remove the second
ping and once that propagates to this tree the timeout will be 10s.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ijc@docker.com>
This is to make it easier to implement support for exporting contexts in
3rd party code, or to create mocks in tests.
2 exemples where it simplify things:
- docker-app desktop-specific context decorator (which rewrites parts of
the docker context to simplify UX when using on Docker Desktop contexts)
- ucp for including a context in the connection bundle
Signed-off-by: Simon Ferquel <simon.ferquel@docker.com>
This PR adds a store to the CLI, that can be leveraged to persist and
retrieve credentials for various API endpoints, as well as
context-specific settings (initially, default stack orchestrator, but we
could expand that).
This comes with the logic to persist and retrieve endpoints configs
for both Docker and Kubernetes APIs.
Signed-off-by: Simon Ferquel <simon.ferquel@docker.com>
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Nicolas De Loof
Ian Campbell
Tibor Vass
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Simon Ferquel