Golang 1.12.12
-------------------------------
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.12.11...go1.12.12
go1.12.12 (released 2019/10/17) includes fixes to the go command, runtime,
syscall and net packages. See the Go 1.12.12 milestone on our issue tracker for
details.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.12.12
Golang 1.12.11 (CVE-2019-17596)
-------------------------------
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.12.10...go1.12.11
go1.12.11 (released 2019/10/17) includes security fixes to the crypto/dsa
package. See the Go 1.12.11 milestone on our issue tracker for details.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.12.11
[security] Go 1.13.2 and Go 1.12.11 are released
Hi gophers,
We have just released Go 1.13.2 and Go 1.12.11 to address a recently reported
security issue. We recommend that all affected users update to one of these
releases (if you're not sure which, choose Go 1.13.2).
Invalid DSA public keys can cause a panic in dsa.Verify. In particular, using
crypto/x509.Verify on a crafted X.509 certificate chain can lead to a panic,
even if the certificates don't chain to a trusted root. The chain can be
delivered via a crypto/tls connection to a client, or to a server that accepts
and verifies client certificates. net/http clients can be made to crash by an
HTTPS server, while net/http servers that accept client certificates will
recover the panic and are unaffected.
Moreover, an application might crash invoking
crypto/x509.(*CertificateRequest).CheckSignature on an X.509 certificate
request, parsing a golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp Entity, or during a
golang.org/x/crypto/otr conversation. Finally, a golang.org/x/crypto/ssh client
can panic due to a malformed host key, while a server could panic if either
PublicKeyCallback accepts a malformed public key, or if IsUserAuthority accepts
a certificate with a malformed public key.
The issue is CVE-2019-17596 and Go issue golang.org/issue/34960.
Thanks to Daniel Mandragona for discovering and reporting this issue. We'd also
like to thank regilero for a previous disclosure of CVE-2019-16276.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 474d522ee2)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This avoids having a redundant `env_file` entry
output when rendering the compose file
Signed-off-by: Ulysses Souza <ulysses.souza@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 821f5ecf53)
Signed-off-by: Christopher Crone <christopher.crone@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Christopher Crone <christopher.crone@docker.com>
(cherry picked from commit 91cf8b04c9)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.12.9...go1.12.10
```
Hi gophers,
We have just released Go 1.13.1 and Go 1.12.10 to address a recently reported security issue. We recommend that all affected users update to one of these releases (if you're not sure which, choose Go 1.13.1).
net/http (through net/textproto) used to accept and normalize invalid HTTP/1.1 headers with a space before the colon, in violation of RFC 7230. If a Go server is used behind an uncommon reverse proxy that accepts and forwards but doesn't normalize such invalid headers, the reverse proxy and the server can interpret the headers differently. This can lead to filter bypasses or request smuggling, the latter if requests from separate clients are multiplexed onto the same upstream connection by the proxy. Such invalid headers are now rejected by Go servers, and passed without normalization to Go client applications.
The issue is CVE-2019-16276 and Go issue golang.org/issue/34540.
Thanks to Andrew Stucki, Adam Scarr (99designs.com), and Jan Masarik (masarik.sh) for discovering and reporting this issue.
Downloads are available at https://golang.org/dl for all supported platforms.
Alla prossima,
Filippo on behalf of the Go team
```
From the patch: 6e6f4aaf70
```
net/textproto: don't normalize headers with spaces before the colon
RFC 7230 is clear about headers with a space before the colon, like
X-Answer : 42
being invalid, but we've been accepting and normalizing them for compatibility
purposes since CL 5690059 in 2012.
On the client side, this is harmless and indeed most browsers behave the same
to this day. On the server side, this becomes a security issue when the
behavior doesn't match that of a reverse proxy sitting in front of the server.
For example, if a WAF accepts them without normalizing them, it might be
possible to bypass its filters, because the Go server would interpret the
header differently. Worse, if the reverse proxy coalesces requests onto a
single HTTP/1.1 connection to a Go server, the understanding of the request
boundaries can get out of sync between them, allowing an attacker to tack an
arbitrary method and path onto a request by other clients, including
authentication headers unknown to the attacker.
This was recently presented at multiple security conferences:
https://portswigger.net/blog/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn
net/http servers already reject header keys with invalid characters.
Simply stop normalizing extra spaces in net/textproto, let it return them
unchanged like it does for other invalid headers, and let net/http enforce
RFC 7230, which is HTTP specific. This loses us normalization on the client
side, but there's no right answer on the client side anyway, and hiding the
issue sounds worse than letting the application decide.
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 8743e36a45)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
full diff: 6120d95c0e...v1.0.2
relevant changes:
- miekg/pkcs11#110 Fix issue freeing memory on GetOperationState when NOT CK_OK
- miekg/pkcs11#106 Move to go modules
- miekg/pkcs11#104 Expose login API for vendor specific login types
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 54428b1f37)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
regression introduced by b34f34
close#39654
Signed-off-by: Nicolas De Loof <nicolas.deloof@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit e25e077a20)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
These changes were made as part of the `docker engine` feature
in commit fd2f1b3b66, but later
reverted in f250152bf4 and
b7ec4a42d9
These lines were forgotten to be removed, and should no longer
be needed.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit de01e72455)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
18.03 has reached EOL; let's use a more current version in CI
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 8b19c1d73a)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
For now, just verifying that an error is returned, but not checking the
error message itself, because those are not under our control, and may
change with different Go versions.
```
=== Failed
=== FAIL: opts TestParseDockerDaemonHost (0.00s)
hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
hosts_test.go:87: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error "Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path" return, got "parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port \":a.b.c.d\" after host" and addr
=== FAIL: opts TestParseTCP (0.00s)
hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
hosts_test.go:129: tcp tcp:a.b.c.d/path address expected error Invalid bind address format: tcp:a.b.c.d/path return, got parse tcp://tcp:a.b.c.d/path: invalid port ":a.b.c.d" after host and addr
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit de1523d221)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
go1.12.8 (released 2019/08/13) includes security fixes to the net/http and net/url packages.
See the Go 1.12.8 milestone on our issue tracker for details:
https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.12.8
- net/http: Denial of Service vulnerabilities in the HTTP/2 implementation
net/http and golang.org/x/net/http2 servers that accept direct connections from untrusted
clients could be remotely made to allocate an unlimited amount of memory, until the program
crashes. Servers will now close connections if the send queue accumulates too many control
messages.
The issues are CVE-2019-9512 and CVE-2019-9514, and Go issue golang.org/issue/33606.
Thanks to Jonathan Looney from Netflix for discovering and reporting these issues.
This is also fixed in version v0.0.0-20190813141303-74dc4d7220e7 of golang.org/x/net/http2.
net/url: parsing validation issue
- url.Parse would accept URLs with malformed hosts, such that the Host field could have arbitrary
suffixes that would appear in neither Hostname() nor Port(), allowing authorization bypasses
in certain applications. Note that URLs with invalid, not numeric ports will now return an error
from url.Parse.
The issue is CVE-2019-14809 and Go issue golang.org/issue/29098.
Thanks to Julian Hector and Nikolai Krein from Cure53, and Adi Cohen (adico.me) for discovering
and reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit bbd179f25b)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This allows overriding the version of Go without making modifications in the
source code, which can be useful to test against multiple versions.
For example:
make GO_VERSION=1.13beta1 -f docker.Makefile binary
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 0d3022c6d2)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The docker-in-docker image now enables TLS by default (added in
docker-library/docker#166), which complicates testing in our
environment, and isn't needed for the tests we're running.
This patch sets the `DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR` to an empty value to
disable TLS.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit b1a3c1aad1)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
The edge channel is deprecated and no longer updated
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 08fd6dd63c)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
1. Adds `docker events` description info on the two scope types of events.
2. Adds `docker events` note in two places about backlog limit of event log.
Further info and background info in Issue 727
Signed-off-by: Bret Fisher <bret@bretfisher.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 988b9a0d96)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
When deploying a stack using a relative path as bind-mount
source in the compose file, the CLI converts the relative
path to an absolute path, relative to the location of the
docker-compose file.
This causes a problem when deploying a stack that uses
an absolute Windows path, because a non-Windows client will
fail to detect that the path (e.g. `C:\somedir`) is an absolute
path (and not a relative directory named `C:\`).
The existing code did already take Windows clients deploying
a Linux stack into account (by checking if the path had a leading
slash). This patch adds the reverse, and adds detection for Windows
absolute paths on non-Windows clients.
The code used to detect Windows absolute paths is copied from the
Golang filepath package;
1d0e94b1e1/src/path/filepath/path_windows.go (L12-L65)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit d6dd08d568)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Andrew Hsu
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Ulysses Souza
Adrian Plata
Christopher Crone
Sebastiaan van Stijn
Tibor Vass
Jintao Zhang
Nicolas De Loof
Kirill Kolyshkin
Rohan Verma
Bret Fisher