DockerCLI/.github/workflows/test.yml

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name: test
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
on:
workflow_dispatch:
push:
branches:
- 'master'
- '[0-9]+.[0-9]{2}'
tags:
- 'v*'
pull_request:
jobs:
ctn:
runs-on: ubuntu-20.04
steps:
-
name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v3
-
name: Set up Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v2
-
name: Test
uses: docker/bake-action@v2
with:
targets: test-coverage
-
name: Send to Codecov
uses: codecov/codecov-action@v3
with:
file: ./build/coverage/coverage.txt
host:
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
env:
GOPATH: ${{ github.workspace }}
GOBIN: ${{ github.workspace }}/bin
GO111MODULE: auto
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os:
- macos-11
# - windows-2022 # FIXME: some tests are failing on the Windows runner, as well as on Appveyor since June 24, 2018: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/docker/cli/history
steps:
-
name: Prepare git
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
run: |
git config --system core.autocrlf false
git config --system core.eol lf
-
name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
path: ${{ env.GOPATH }}/src/github.com/docker/cli
-
name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v3
with:
Update to go 1.19.2 to address CVE-2022-2879, CVE-2022-2880, CVE-2022-41715 From the mailing list: We have just released Go versions 1.19.2 and 1.18.7, minor point releases. These minor releases include 3 security fixes following the security policy: - archive/tar: unbounded memory consumption when reading headers Reader.Read did not set a limit on the maximum size of file headers. A maliciously crafted archive could cause Read to allocate unbounded amounts of memory, potentially causing resource exhaustion or panics. Reader.Read now limits the maximum size of header blocks to 1 MiB. Thanks to Adam Korczynski (ADA Logics) and OSS-Fuzz for reporting this issue. This is CVE-2022-2879 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/54853. - net/http/httputil: ReverseProxy should not forward unparseable query parameters Requests forwarded by ReverseProxy included the raw query parameters from the inbound request, including unparseable parameters rejected by net/http. This could permit query parameter smuggling when a Go proxy forwards a parameter with an unparseable value. ReverseProxy will now sanitize the query parameters in the forwarded query when the outbound request's Form field is set after the ReverseProxy.Director function returns, indicating that the proxy has parsed the query parameters. Proxies which do not parse query parameters continue to forward the original query parameters unchanged. Thanks to Gal Goldstein (Security Researcher, Oxeye) and Daniel Abeles (Head of Research, Oxeye) for reporting this issue. This is CVE-2022-2880 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/54663. - regexp/syntax: limit memory used by parsing regexps The parsed regexp representation is linear in the size of the input, but in some cases the constant factor can be as high as 40,000, making relatively small regexps consume much larger amounts of memory. Each regexp being parsed is now limited to a 256 MB memory footprint. Regular expressions whose representation would use more space than that are now rejected. Normal use of regular expressions is unaffected. Thanks to Adam Korczynski (ADA Logics) and OSS-Fuzz for reporting this issue. This is CVE-2022-41715 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/55949. View the release notes for more information: https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.19.2 Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
2022-10-04 14:51:47 -04:00
go-version: 1.19.2
-
name: Test
run: |
go test -coverprofile=/tmp/coverage.txt $(go list ./... | grep -vE '/vendor/|/e2e/')
go tool cover -func=/tmp/coverage.txt
working-directory: ${{ env.GOPATH }}/src/github.com/docker/cli
shell: bash
-
name: Send to Codecov
uses: codecov/codecov-action@v3
with:
file: /tmp/coverage.txt
working-directory: ${{ env.GOPATH }}/src/github.com/docker/cli