bump golang 1.12.10 (CVE-2019-16276)
full diff: https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.12.9...go1.12.10
```
Hi gophers,
We have just released Go 1.13.1 and Go 1.12.10 to address a recently reported security issue. We recommend that all affected users update to one of these releases (if you're not sure which, choose Go 1.13.1).
net/http (through net/textproto) used to accept and normalize invalid HTTP/1.1 headers with a space before the colon, in violation of RFC 7230. If a Go server is used behind an uncommon reverse proxy that accepts and forwards but doesn't normalize such invalid headers, the reverse proxy and the server can interpret the headers differently. This can lead to filter bypasses or request smuggling, the latter if requests from separate clients are multiplexed onto the same upstream connection by the proxy. Such invalid headers are now rejected by Go servers, and passed without normalization to Go client applications.
The issue is CVE-2019-16276 and Go issue golang.org/issue/34540.
Thanks to Andrew Stucki, Adam Scarr (99designs.com), and Jan Masarik (masarik.sh) for discovering and reporting this issue.
Downloads are available at https://golang.org/dl for all supported platforms.
Alla prossima,
Filippo on behalf of the Go team
```
From the patch: https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6e6f4aaf70c8b1cc81e65a26332aa9409de03ad8
```
net/textproto: don't normalize headers with spaces before the colon
RFC 7230 is clear about headers with a space before the colon, like
X-Answer : 42
being invalid, but we've been accepting and normalizing them for compatibility
purposes since CL 5690059 in 2012.
On the client side, this is harmless and indeed most browsers behave the same
to this day. On the server side, this becomes a security issue when the
behavior doesn't match that of a reverse proxy sitting in front of the server.
For example, if a WAF accepts them without normalizing them, it might be
possible to bypass its filters, because the Go server would interpret the
header differently. Worse, if the reverse proxy coalesces requests onto a
single HTTP/1.1 connection to a Go server, the understanding of the request
boundaries can get out of sync between them, allowing an attacker to tack an
arbitrary method and path onto a request by other clients, including
authentication headers unknown to the attacker.
This was recently presented at multiple security conferences:
https://portswigger.net/blog/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn
net/http servers already reject header keys with invalid characters.
Simply stop normalizing extra spaces in net/textproto, let it return them
unchanged like it does for other invalid headers, and let net/http enforce
RFC 7230, which is HTTP specific. This loses us normalization on the client
side, but there's no right answer on the client side anyway, and hiding the
issue sounds worse than letting the application decide.
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
2019-09-27 17:30:54 -04:00
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ARG GO_VERSION=1.12.10
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2019-07-18 05:13:45 -04:00
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FROM golang:${GO_VERSION}-alpine
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2017-05-02 15:10:03 -04:00
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RUN apk add -U git
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2018-07-12 08:09:22 -04:00
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ARG GOMETALINTER_SHA=v2.0.6
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2017-07-18 12:22:28 -04:00
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RUN go get -d github.com/alecthomas/gometalinter && \
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2017-07-11 14:19:02 -04:00
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cd /go/src/github.com/alecthomas/gometalinter && \
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git checkout -q "$GOMETALINTER_SHA" && \
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go build -v -o /usr/local/bin/gometalinter . && \
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gometalinter --install && \
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rm -rf /go/src/* /go/pkg/*
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2017-05-02 15:10:03 -04:00
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WORKDIR /go/src/github.com/docker/cli
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2017-06-09 12:32:14 -04:00
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ENV CGO_ENABLED=0
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2017-08-15 14:32:44 -04:00
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ENV DISABLE_WARN_OUTSIDE_CONTAINER=1
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2017-05-02 15:10:03 -04:00
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ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/gometalinter"]
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2017-06-09 12:32:14 -04:00
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CMD ["--config=gometalinter.json", "./..."]
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Do not patch Dockerfiles in CI
When building the Dockerfiles for development, those images are mainly used to
create a reproducible build-environment. The source code is bind-mounted into
the image at runtime; there is no need to create an image with the actual
source code, and copying the source code into the image would lead to a new
image being created for each code-change (possibly leading up to many "dangling"
images for previous code-changes).
However, when building (and using) the development images in CI, bind-mounting
is not an option, because the daemon is running remotely.
To make this work, the circle-ci script patched the Dockerfiles when CI is run;
adding a `COPY` to the respective Dockerfiles.
Patching Dockerfiles is not really a "best practice" and, even though the source
code does not and up in the image, the source would still be _sent_ to the daemon
for each build (unless BuildKit is used).
This patch updates the makefiles, circle-ci script, and Dockerfiles;
- When building the Dockerfiles locally, pipe the Dockerfile through stdin.
Doing so, prevents the build-context from being sent to the daemon. This speeds
up the build, and doesn't fill up the Docker "temp" directory with content that's
not used
- Now that no content is sent, add the COPY instructions to the Dockerfiles, and
remove the code in the circle-ci script to "live patch" the Dockerfiles.
Before this patch is applied (with cache):
```
$ time make -f docker.Makefile build_shell_validate_image
docker build -t docker-cli-shell-validate -f ./dockerfiles/Dockerfile.shellcheck .
Sending build context to Docker daemon 41MB
Step 1/2 : FROM debian:stretch-slim
...
Successfully built 81e14e8ad856
Successfully tagged docker-cli-shell-validate:latest
2.75 real 0.45 user 0.56 sys
```
After this patch is applied (with cache)::
```
$ time make -f docker.Makefile build_shell_validate_image
cat ./dockerfiles/Dockerfile.shellcheck | docker build -t docker-cli-shell-validate -
Sending build context to Docker daemon 2.048kB
Step 1/2 : FROM debian:stretch-slim
...
Successfully built 81e14e8ad856
Successfully tagged docker-cli-shell-validate:latest
0.33 real 0.07 user 0.08 sys
```
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
2018-11-28 19:06:10 -05:00
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COPY . .
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